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REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Plaintiff submits this brief in reply to the Brief of
Respondents Texaco Inc., Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining
Company ("Getty's Brief").

The statement of the facts and the

statement of the issues on appeal are unchanged from
plaintiff's opening brief ("Plaintiff's Brief").
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Getty errs when it asserts that an abuse of discretion
standard of review is applicable to this discovery dispute.
"The issue whether [materials] are protected by the . . . work
product doctrine is a question of law." Langdon v. Champion,
752 P.2d 999, 1001 (Alaska 1988).

Accordingly, no deference

should be afforded to the lower court's decision, particularly
since this court has before it, as the record on appeal, the
identical paper submissions that were presented to the trial
court.
However, even under an abuse of discretion standard,
the lower court's failure to "properly identify and apply the
law to the facts" constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Southern

Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Astorquia, 746 P.2d 985, 987
(Idaho 1987).

Therefore, under either standard, the ruling of

the lower court should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN HOLDING THAT THE
MEMORANDA ARE PROTECTED WORK PRODUCT.
It is indisputable that Getty, as the asserting party,

has the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the work
product doctrine.

See Barclavsamerican Corp. v. Kane, 746 F.2d

653, 656 (10th Cir. 1984).

However, Getty has failed to

establish that the management investigation undertaken by Mintz
and Kundert, which was devoid of any attorney involvement, is
worthy of such protection.
A.

The Memoranda Lack the Requisite Attorney
Involvement to Constitute Work Product.
Although criticized by Getty, the rule that attorney

involvement is necessary to generate protectable work product,
as stated in the seminal case of Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska
Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. 111. 1972), is

nonetheless recognized as the majority view.

The Alaska

Supreme Court recently noted:
The majority of courts dealing with the
problem have taken the position that
litigation is not "anticipated" until the
expectation of litigation is such that an
attorney has become involved in the dispute
and has prepared the documents himself or
has requested their preparation.
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Lanqdon v. Champion, supra, 752 P.2d 999, 1005 (Alaska 1988)
(numerous citations omitted).
Plaintiffs Brief at 23-25.

See also cases cited in
The few cases relied upon by

Getty, to the effect that protectable work product may be
created without any attorney involvement, see Getty's Brief at
22-24, are distinctly the minority view.
In support of its position, Getty places principal
reliance on the language of Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, as that Rule was amended in 1970. That Rule
now provides that a document may be eligible for work product
protection if it is prepared "by or for another party or by or
for that other party's representative . . . ."
Pro. 26(b)(3).

Utah R. Civ.

Thus, Getty contends, any representative of a

party may generate work product.
Plaintiff submits that this portion of the Rule is
unfortunately worded, and that the Court should not adopt the
construction opted for by Getty.

The Rule must be read

consistent with its historical policy, to create a zone of
privacy for the lawyer preparing a case for trial. The
"representatives" referred to in the Rule should be construed
to include those people that act as extensions of the attorney.
Particularly in complex litigation, no one attorney
can do all the trial preparation.

-3-

Therefore the Rule was

expanded, to extend work product protection to representatives
that may act as extensions of the attorney engaged in the trial
preparation process.

This interpretation of the Rule (although

admittedly somewhat at odds with its language) was squarely
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225 (1975).

The Court there stated:

[A]ttorneys often must rely on the
assistance of investigators and other agents
in the compilation of materials in
preparation for trial. It is therefore
necessary that the doctrine protect material
prepared by agents for the attorney as well
as those prepared by the attorney himself.
Id,, at 238-39 (emphasis added).

The court noted further:

The sole issue in Hickman related to
materials prepared by an attorney, and
courts thereafter disagreed over whether the
doctrine applied as well to materials
prepared on his behalf. . . . Necessarily,
it must. This view is reflected in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Fed
Rule Civ Proc 26(b)(3) . . . ."
Id. at 239, n. 13 (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that no attorney ever had any
involvement in the underlying investigation, or the preparation
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of the Kundert and Mintz Memoranda.

Therefore they cannot,

plaintiff submits, constitute work product.-^
B.

Even Those Cases That Recognize the Possibility of
Protectable Work Product Without Attorney Involvment
Would Not Extend Such Protection to the
Kundert/Mintz Investigation.
Plaintiff recognizes that, as Getty points out, there

are a small handful of cases in which the courts have extended
work product protection to documents prepared without any
attorney involvement.

A reading of the cases cited by Getty

reveals, however, that in each case, the non-attorney authors
of work product were performing the type of functions that are

±-' Plaintiff submits that, since the purpose of the doctrine
is to protect materials that were created "to aid in possible
future litigation," Janicker v. George Washington University,
94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982), a document cannot qualify for
work product protection unless its author is, at the very
least, part of a team that is purposefully engaged in the
preparation of trial materials. Unless the materials are
prepared with an "eye toward litigation," Hickman v. Taylor,
379 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), they cannot be work product. Getty
has cited no cases where work product protection has been
extended to a document whose author had no idea of any
potential litigation. Plaintiff submits that, as the court
held in Scott Paper Co. v. Ceilcote Co., 103 F.R.D. 591 (D. Me.
1984), work product protection will not be extended where "the
author was reporting his and others* perceptions of the
opposing parties' position rather than purposefully producing
materials that would aid in impending litigation." Id. at 597.
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ordinarily performed by an attorney.

Getty cites no case in

which work product protection is extended to a non-attorney
author who is simply reporting an investigation of historical
facts, without any awareness that his investigation has
anything to do with potential litigation.
One of the principal cases relied upon by Getty for
this proposition, Duplan Corp. v. Peering Milliken Inc., 540
F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976), aptly illustrates this point.

In

Duplan. protection was afforded to materials prepared by a
conseil en brevets, a French patent representative for which
there is no American legal equivalent.

The documents in

question were drafted by the patent agent in his capacity as
the party's representative, and concerned a prior litigation
and settlement agreement in which he was intimately involved.
Id. at 1218-1219.

Thus, the non-attorney who was afforded

protection was essentially acting as a lawyer.
Similarly, in Moore v. Tri-Citv Hospital Authority,
118 F.R.D. 646 (N.D. Ga. 1988), the other principal authority
relied on by Getty, diary entries prepared by a party prior to
retaining counsel were protected because they manifested legal
thoughts and ideas normally expressed by an attorney.

The

diary contained "[thoughts] about persons who could serve as
witnesses, attorneys who could assist [the party], and legal
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arguments that could be made on [the party's] behalf."
650.

Id. at

Thus they were protected because, again, plaintiff

submits, the party was doing the type of thing ordinarily done
by an attorney.
None of the cases cited by Getty provides authority to
extend work product protection to the Kundert and Mintz
Memoranda.

Kundert and Mintz were not acting as Getty's legal

representatives, as in PupIan; nor were they expressing
thoughts about legal strategy, as in Moore.

In short, neither

was doing the type of thing that ordinarily would be done by an
attorney.

Instead Kundert, who himself had no idea that his

investigation had anything to do with any potential litigation,
merely performed an historical investigation of a purely
technical matter—whether or not a feasibility study had been
prepared in connection with the Mercur Project.

This is not

the type of non-attorney investigation that, even under the
authorities relied upon by Getty, could possibly qualify for
work product protection.
C.

Non-Legal Corporate Management Investigations Are
Not Protectable.
In Plaintiff's Brief, several cases are cited to

support the proposition that internal management
investigations, even where litigation clearly is anticipated,
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cannot result in the creation of work product.
Brief at 28-31.

See Plaintiff's

Getty attempts to dismiss these cases on the

basis that in none of them had there been a prior demand letter
sent to the party claiming work product protection.

Getty

argues that this case is totally different than those relied
upon by plaintiff, because here Getty had received a demand
letter from plaintiff before the Kundert and Mintz
investigation.
By making this argument, Getty is attempting to create
a new legal threshold, under which any internal investigation
of historical facts made after a demand letter has been
received, shall remain secret.

Getty cites not one case,

however, in support of this thesis.

No authority is offered

for the proposition that receipt of a demand letter is an
important factor (or any factor at all) for determining whether
a document created later is protected work product.^/

Getty

has simply concocted this alleged distinguishing factor out of
thin air.

£-' At least one court has explicitly rejected the notion that
the receipt of a demand letter provides automatic work product
protection. In Binks Manufacturing Co. v. National Presto
Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1983), a demand
letter prepared by corporate counsel did not provide the basis
for work product protection because although the letter
demanded payment in full of an amount owed, it did not
explicitly threaten litigation. See id. at 1119-1120.
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Plaintiff concedes, however, that in certain
circumstances, the sending of a demand letter may at least be a
factor bearing on this issue.

It still provides no basis,

however, to distinguish the several authorities cited by
plaintiff, at pages 28 to 31 of Plaintiff's Brief.

In each of

those cases, the courts expressly determined that although, as
the courts found, litigation clearly was anticipated at the
time of their creation, the results of in-house management
investigations into the underlying facts were not work
product.

Getty's effort to distinguish these cases, on the

basis of a factor that no court has even considered in this
analysis—the receipt of a demand letter—is completely
unpersuasive.
D.

The Work Product Doctrine Does Not Provide a Right
of Secrecy Simply Because a Threat or Allegation has
Been Made.
Throughout its brief, Getty is careful not to analyze

the issue on this appeal in terms of any of the traditional,
recognized policy objectives of the work product doctrine—that
is, preservation of the integrity of the adversary system,
protection of its trial preparation process, or the protection
of the thought processes of attorneys.

Instead, Getty is in

reality endorsing a completely new policy objective for the
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doctrine.

Its most candid statement of its true position is

set forth at page 29 of its brief:
[W]hen a potential adversary, like Gold
Standard in this case, makes particularized
and direct allegations of legal liability,
an opposing party should be able to begin
preparations to defend itself against the
specific allegations asserted by its
opponent, without fear of compelled
disclosure of its preparation to the
accusing party.
Nowhere, however, does Getty attempt to explain why
this should be the case.

Getty has attempted, subtly, to shift

the inquiry away from the protection of the adversary system,
to convince the court to establish a new right—to keep the
true facts secret as soon as litigation is a prospect.

The

work product doctrine is not designed, however, to hide the
facts.

This court should not endorse Getty's attempt to

distort the doctrine in this manner.
II.

THE COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP EXCEPTION TO THE WORK PRODUCT
DOCTRINE.
A.

A Party's Non-Legal Employees Do Not Qualify for
Opinion Work Product Protection.
Getty asserts that the Memoranda contain "opinion"

work product, and therefore are not discoverable even if the
showing of substantial need and undue hardship has been made.
Even if the Memoranda are deemed to contain opinions rather
-10-

than facts,3/ the opinions of non-legal employees do not
receive the heightened protection afforded an attorney's
opinions, and are thus discoverable upon a showing of
"substantial need" of the Memoranda and "undue hardship" in
obtaining their equivalent elsewhere.
1.

Kundert and Mintz cannot produce opinion work
product.

By definition, opinion work product can only be
created by "an attorney or other representative of a party."
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26(b)(3).

It does not apply to a party or to

a party's employees, and thus employee opinions are not
afforded heightened protection.

In North Georgia Lumber &

Hardware v. Home Insurance Co., 82 F.R.D. 678 (N.D. Ga. 1979),
the court held that "mental impressions and personal
evaluations" of a party's employees were discoverable upon a
showing "similar to that required to overcome" the protection
afforded ordinary work product.

Id. at 680.

See also State

*-' A reading of the Memoranda reveals plainly that they
contain recitations of historical facts, not opinions. Even
Kundert's statement that "I explained to Hautala that, in my
view, the Bechtel work could not be used as a final Feasibility
Study" (the one statement in the Memoranda most closely
resembling an "opinion"), is not reported as a presently held
opinion, but is instead merely a factual account of a statement
he made to Hautala in 1981.
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Farm Fire and Casualty Co, v. Perrigan, 102 F.R.D. 235, 237
(W.D. Va. 1984).
Getty cites four cases to demonstrate that opinion
work product may be generated by a "party and its nonattorney
representatives,"' Getty's Brief at 35, and argues that the
Kundert and Mintz Memoranda should therefore receive this
heightened protection.

However, none of Getty's cases extend

heightened protection to the opinions of a party's employees.
Those cases only afforded heightened protection to
investigators hired by attorneys, see Laxalt v. McClaltchy, 116
F.R.D. 438 (D. Nev. 1987); Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1978), and to a
representative performing legal duties.

See Duplan, supra.

In

fact, in United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640
(S.D. Ga. 1976), FBI investigative reports were not even
afforded heightened protection but were subject to disclosure
upon a finding of substantial hardship.

See id. at 643. Thus

Kundert and Mintz, oS non-legal employees, are not even capable
of creating opinion work product.
2.

Only purely legal opinions can constitute
opinion work product.

A further limitation on opinion work product is that
it includes only opinions about litigation; it does not embrace
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non-legal opinions as to the underlying facts.

In Sporck v.

Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert, denied 474 U.S. 903,
the court protected "an attorney's legal strategy, his intended
lines of proof, his evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses
of his case, and the inferences he draws from interviews of
witnesses."

Id. at 316.

Likewise, courts have protected

opinion letters outlining a party's potential legal claims, see
Parry v. Highlight Industries, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 449, 452 (W.D.
Mich. 1989), as well as a party's conception of the law and its
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of its case.

See

McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223, 1231 (Alaska 1983).
In short, the decided cases granting heightened protection to
"opinion work product" have all addressed opinions somehow
relating to the litigation process.
Opinion work product must also pertain to pending
litigation.

Rule 26(b)(3), as it concerns opinion work

product, avoids the "anticipation of litigation" language used
earlier in the Rule, and instead only embraces opinions
generated "concerning the litigation."
26(b)(3) (emphasis added).

Utah R. Civ. Pro.

This difference in language

indicates that only opinions prepared for an actually existing,
as opposed to merely "anticipated" litigation, are protected.
To this end, the court in Brown v. Maricopa Superior Court, 670
P.2d 725 (Ariz. 1983), held that heightened protection "only
-13-

applies to the case being litigated and not to such material
prepared for some prior case."

Id. at 735-36 n. 8 (emphasis

added).
Thus, opinion work product can only be produced by an
attorney, or one working intimately with an attorney, and must
consist of legal thoughts and strategies concerning ongoing
litigation.

Getty has not, and cannot, cite any authority

granting heightened opinion work product protection to
corporate employees conducting internal factual investigations,
whose reports do not even mention any actual litigation.
Therefore, the Memoranda are discoverable upon a showing of
substantial need and undue hardship.
B.

The Plaintiff Has Demonstrated Both Substantial Need
And Undue Hardship.
The lower court did not rule on whether the

substantial hardship exception applied in this matter, even
though, contrary to Getty's assertions, plaintiff did present
this matter to the lower court.

In addition to consistently

reiterating the importance of these documents, plaintiff
dedicated three pages in its brief below to demonstrate that it
could not obtain the facts demonstrated by the Memoranda
elsewhere.

R. at 3207-3205.

In fact, in that brief an

argument heading explicitly stated that "Gold Standard Is
Entitled to These Documents Under the Fraud or Hardship
-14-

Exceptions."

R. at 3193. Thus, because plaintiff adequately

raised and argued this issue below, the lower court's failure
to apply this exception is an error of law.4/
1.

The Memoranda are important both for their
contents and because they were shown to Texaco.

The Memoranda are important for a variety of reasons.
First, they contain a view from Getty's upper management that
the Bechtel study could not be used as a final feasibility
study.

See Addendum I to Plaintiffs Brief.

This view

directly contradicts Getty's position in this case, and
specifically contradicts deposition testimony later given by
Kundert and Mintz on the feasibility study issue.

See

Plaintiff's Brief at 37-41.
The Memoranda are important not only for the probative
worth of their contents.

In addition, they are important

because they were the only information available to Texaco when
it told Gold Standard that its claim regarding the feasibility
study was a "lame excuse."

See Plaintiffs Brief at 41-43.

They are thus vital to enable plaintiff to prove its claim that
Texaco deliberately violated Gold Standard's right of first
4/ Even if this court should determine that this issue was not
adequately raised below, it still has authority to consider the
issue on appeal, if "injustice might otherwise result."
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976).

-15-

refusal, and to demonstrate Texaco's callous disregard, in the
face of the contents of the Memoranda, of Gold Standard's
rights.
Throughout its Brief, Getty attempts to minimize the
overall significance of the Memoranda, apparently based on the
view that, if they aren't really very important anyway,
plaintiff could not have any "substantial need" for them.
First Getty asserts that Kundert's investigation only
encompassed documents prepared through October, 1980.
Getty's Brief at 9-10.

See

However, the Memoranda themselves

reveal, to the contrary, that Kundert in fact examined
documents created well after this date.

Getty further asserts

that "Kundert did not review the documents given to Gold
Standard in July 1981 which Getty maintains constituted the
feasibility study . . . ."

Getty Brief at 10. The Kundert

Memorandum itself, however, specifically refers to "the Bechtel
work" (provided by Getty as part of the alleged "feasibility
study"), stating that it "could not be used as a final
Feasiblity Study [since] Bechtel had not reviewed the geology
and ore reserves because updated data were not available; thus
the document was incomplete."

Addendum I to Plaintiff's Brief.

Getty also attempts to minimize the significance of
the Kundert inquiry by contending that the letter from Texaco
to Scott Smith following the inquiry, wherein Getty denied that
-16-

it had failed to provide an adequate feasibility study, was
based on "more complete information provided by those with
direct knowledge of the circumstances."
9-10.

Getty's Brief at

However, this assertion is totally unfounded; Texaco has

never provided any evidence that any information, other than
the Memoranda, was relied upon when Getty, on Texaco's behalf,
told Gold Standard that its claim regarding the lack of a
proper feasibility study was "contrary to a long series of
facts and admissions."

See Addendum X to Plaintiff's Brief.

In all events, the ultimate significance of the
Memoranda is something to be determined by the trier of fact.
Plaintiff believes they are extremely significant; at trial,
Getty will be entitled to present any evidence that may detract
from their overall significance.

The fact that defendants may

have some strategy to "explain away" this damaging evidence is
no basis, in all events, to shield them from the discovery
process.
2.

Plaintiff cannot obtain this important evidence
anywhere else.

The Memoranda contain a variety of facts relating
Kundert's and Mintz's perceptions of the Mercur Project from
1979 through 1981. Although plaintiff, admittedly, might be
able to obtain some of the background information elsewhere,
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Kundert's and Mintz1s personal recollections, and particularly
their statements concerning the inadequacy of the Bechtel
report, cannot be obtained anywhere else.

See Plaintiff's

Brief at 36-40.
In addition to the contradictory testimony given by
Kundert and Mintz, other Getty and Texaco personnel have
likewise given testimony at odds with the facts evidenced by
the Memoranda.

Although the circumstances giving rise to the

creation of the Memoranda, see Plaintiffs Brief at 8, 42
n. 16, help to demonstrate Texaco1s intimate involvement with
the Kundert investigation, Texaco has denied knowledge of the
Kundert investigation.

H. Edward Wendt, the President of Getty

Mining who communicated with Mintz regarding Kundert1s inquiry,
did not recall having received the Mintz memorandum or even
having been involved in the Kundert investigation.
3102-3097.

R^_ at

Similarly, Willis B. Reals, the Texaco Vice

President who Getty claims initiated the inquiry, testified
that he never saw the Memoranda and was never told about the
results of the investigation by Wendt or anyone else.

IL_ at

3107-3106.-^/

±' A transmittal from Wendt to Reals, however, plainly reveals
that the Memoranda were provided to Texaco's Reals. See
Addendum XIII to Plaintiffs Brief; Plaintiffs Brief at 42
n. 16.
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Despite all of this conflicting testimony, Getty
maintains that plaintiff has not shown sufficient hardship.

To

the contrary, plaintiff has demonstrated blatant contradictions
between the Memoranda and the testimony of important
witnesses.

This is not "mere conjecture" of a discrepancy in

testimony, as argued by Getty; the discrepancy between the 1984
and 1988 statements of these Getty and Texaco personnel is
palpable.
III.

THE COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT GETTY WAIVED WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION.
Getty does not even attempt to seriously address

plaintiffs arguments on the waiver issue.

Rather than discuss

waiver cases in the context of the discovery of documents
(which provides no support for Getty's position), Getty cites
only to general case law on waiver.

It argues that since

Getty's trial lawyers did not know there might be a potential
claim of work product for the Memoranda,& it could not have
waived its right to make this claim, even though it
deliberately produced the documents.

-&-7 As noted in Plaintiff's Brief at 47, this assertion is in
and of itself something of an oxymoron.
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A.

Getty's Failure to Maintain the Confidentiality
of the Memoranda Waived any Work Product
Protection.

Getty's argument completely ignores the entire policy
justification for affording protection to documents in the
first place—certain documents, whether protected by the
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or on
some other basis, may be eligible for protection if they are
maintained as confidential.

This is because they contain

materals that, the law recognizes, a party may be entitled to
keep secret.

Once they have been disclosed to the adverse

party, however, the underlying confidentiality is lost, and
there is no longer any reason to continue to treat them
confidentially.

That is, once otherwise protectable documents

have been disclosed, it is no longer possible to achieve the
benefits of any privilege—i.e., confidentiality—and the
privilege is lost.

See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446

F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976); United States v.
Kelsev-Haves Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich.
1954)("when the policy underlying the rule can no longer be
served, it would amount to no more than mechanical obedience to
a formula to continue to recognize it." (emphasis added)).
Once confidentiality is lost, the objective of preserving
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secrecy must yield to the overriding concern of the litigation
process—ascertainment of the truth.
Here there is no dispute that Getty "voluntarily
produced [the Memoranda] after [they] had knowledge that [the
plaintiff] had them."

R. at 3096.

After that production,

Getty thereafter failed to object to the use of the Memoranda
in numerous depositions.

Yet Getty now claims, without citing

any authority, that there was no waiver because its lawyers
didn't know they might have a potential work product claim, and
thus a basis to keep the facts contained in the Memoranda a
secret.
Getty's interpretation of waiver fails to recognize
this cornerstone principle of confidentiality.

Getty's view is

especially untenable where, as here, the Memoranda were
generated by Getty's own in-house inquiry.

After the existence

of the Memoranda became known to Getty in 1987, a minimal
internal investigation should have alerted Getty to the
Memoranda's supposed work product significance.
to make such an inquiry.

Getty failed

Instead, Getty now advocates a view

that rewards it for neglecting to investigate the origins of
materials within its domain, and penalizes its opponent for
having used those materials after they were knowingly and
voluntarily disclosed.
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B.

The Inadvertent Disclosure Exception Is
Inapplicable Where Gettv Did Not Mistakenly
Produce The Memoranda.

Some jurisdictions permit a party who "inadvertently"
produces materials to have its mistake rectified.-2/ See,
e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104
F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

Getty and the lower court relied

upon this doctrine to excuse Getty's production of the
Memoranda.

However, because Getty produced the Memoranda

knowingly and voluntarily, and not mistakingly, that exception
has no application to the present case.
As its title suggests, this exception has only been
applied to cases wherein a document is produced
"inadvertently"—that is, by accident.

Not one case has

applied this exception when a party voluntarily produces a
document and then attempts to retract it by later claiming that
it was previously unaware of a basis to withhold the document.
As a matter of law, Getty clearly waived work product
protection of the Memoranda by voluntarily producing them.
Getty made no clerical mistake when it produced the Memoranda;

-L' Some jurisdictions apply instead a strict waiver standard,
denying protection even when production is inadvertant. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Products, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 237
(W.D.N.C. 1987).
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its only mistake was in failing to investigate their origin.
No recognized legal principle supports Getty's view that its
claim of work product privilege has not been waived.
CONCLUSION
Getty personnel created the Memoranda as part of a
factual, non-legal investigation, without the involvement of
attorneys.

Thus, the Memoranda cannot be work product, and

even if they could, they are discoverable based on plaintiffs
showing of substantial need and undue hardship.

Further, Getty

voluntarily produced the Memoranda, thereby waiving any claim
of confidentiality for the documents.
Getty had the burden of demonstrating that the
Memoranda were within the ambit of the narrow work product rule
in order to exclude the Memoranda from discovery.
to do so.

They failed

Thus, these important and unique documents must be

made available for plaintiffs use throughout the course of the
proceedings below.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 1989.
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